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【要約】In this paper, we explore the relationship between work-life balance policies and 
three outcomes of interest to employers and employees: the job tenure of women 
employees, turnover rate of women employees and retention rate of new women 
graduates. In the cross sectional analysis, we find that firms with work-life balance 
policies such as the full amount of maternity pay practice and flextime system are 
positively associated with the job tenure of women employees. We also find that the full 
amount of maternity pay practice has an effect on retention rate of new women graduates. 
However, we can’t find the relationship between maternity pay practice and job tenure of 
women employees in fixed effects. Even though our hypothesis just receives partial 
support, our results still suggest that work-life balance policies such as the full amount of 
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  1Introduction 
Organizational response to work-life conflict of employees is an important issue that 
has received broad attention from governments, researchers, employers and employee 
representatives in recent years. 
Figure 1 showing the percentage of women over 15 in the labor force by age bracket in 
Japan in 2006 represents a curve shaped like the alphabetical letter M, with the age 
brackets 25 to 29 and 45 to 49 being two peaks. It means that a majority of women quit 
their jobs when they get married or give birth to a child, and re-enter the labor market 
when their children have grown up.   
Even if the child-care leave law was enforced in Japan in April 1992
1, the declining 
trend of women labor force participation between 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 still exist. It 
means that only child-care leave system is not enough for the women after their childbirth. 
Work-life conflict could happen to employees at each stage in life. As a result, the 
demands of managing work and life balance need to be addressed for many families. 
Work-life balance policies now encompass a wide range of programs, including 
maternity leave, child and family care leave and flexible work arrangements
2. Firms’ 
adoption of work-life policies have grown significantly in recent years. Yet Firms also are 
seeking ways to reduce the cost of benefits in the current competitive and cost-conscious 
                                                 
1 Formally it is called “Law Concerning the Welfare of Workers Who Take Care of Children or Other Family Members Including Child 
Care and Family Care Leave”. The law was established in May 1991. 
2 Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare declares some work-life balance policy indexes such as child-care/ family-care system 
and benefits. See http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/koyou/ryouritu/shihyou.html   
  2climate. 
Even though firms have cost-benefit considerations of work-life balance policies, a 
growing number of studies find that work-life balance policies generate performance 
benefits for firms by enhancing recruitment and reducing absenteeism and turnover (Helen, 
2002). And firms that seek to increase employee morale, commitment and satisfaction, and 
reduce source of stress and problems at work, will improve their ability to recruit and 
retain talented and valued employees (Cappelli, 2000). 
In this paper, we set out to examine whether firms that adopt various work-life balance 
policies increase the job tenure and decrease turnover probability of women employees. 
Different from prior studies that just involve general women employees, we also analyze 
the effect of work-life balance policies on new women graduates. We draw on the data in 
2000, 2005 and 2008 editions of Quarterly Female Employment Report in Japan to 
examine our assumption. 
 
Prior Literature 
Work-life balance policies and outcomes 
Some researchers have examined the outcomes of work-life balance policies and they 
have demonstrated significant and positive outcomes for employers and employees. 
Organizational solutions to work-life conflict of employees have focused heavily on 
  3specific work-life balance policies and practices, such as child-care services or flexible 
scheduling.  
There are some modest empirical literatures on dependent-care services increased 
retention rates in the short term, but these studies did not explore long-term attachment to 
the firm (Youngblood and Chambers-Cook, 1984; Ellen and Victor, 1992). 
In addition, a lot of researchers have examined the outcomes of flexible time system. 
Early studies of absenteeism and turnover found that it was lower among employees who 
used flextime system. Dalton and Mesch (1990) compared the absenteeism and turnover 
of employees in two divisions of one company: one with and one without flexible system. 
Absenteeism fell significantly in the case of employees who used flexible system, but 
turnover was not affected. Thomas and Ganster (1995) found that employees who used 
flexible practices had more control over managing work and family demands and had also 
higher job satisfaction. However, they did not find a significant relationship between these 
flexible practices and absenteeism. Grover and Crooker (1995) found that employees in 
companies with organizational work-life balance benefits had higher levels of 
organizational commitment to the organization and expressed lower turnover intentions, 
regardless of whether the employee individually benefited from the policy.   
More recently, Helen et al.(2005) have reported a link between an organization’s 
commitment to work-life balance policies and the employee’s commitment to the 
  4organization. This study of civil engineers reported higher commitment, job satisfaction, 
and lower turnover intention when the employees’ perceived their organization to be 
supportive of work-life balance initiatives. These results provide evidence that work-life 
balance policies are related to organizational performance in the Australian construction 
industry. 
Work-life balance policies are also reported to: improve organizations’ competitiveness 
by increasing their ability to attract employees (Bruck and Spector, 2002); induce 
employees to exercise discretionary effort in performing their work; and help employees 
to be more productive (Konrad and Mangel, 2001). Further, Lambert (2000) reported a 
positive relationship between the announcement of organizational work-life balance 
policies and shareholder returns, indicating that investors view family-friendly firms more 
favorably.  
In sum, the prior studies have examined some outcomes associated with work-life 
balance policies. However, some prior studies have examined only an isolated practice. 
We set out to examine the outcomes of various work-life balance policies in this paper. 
Moreover, because most of prior studies rely on cross sectional data, they cannot and do 
not control for unobserved firm effects. In this paper, using panel data allows us to control 
for firm specific effects. 
 
  5Hypothesis 
Prior researches do indicate that work-life balance policies should be significantly 
related to outcomes of interest to employees and employers, leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Firms that have access to work-life balance policies will have longer jog tenure of women 
employees, lower turnover rate of women employees and higher retention rate of new 
women graduates. 
 
Research Method   
Data  
For this study, the data are drawn from the 2000, 2005 and 2008 editions of Quarterly 
Female Employment Report in Japan. The survey was conducted in 1998, 2003 and 2006 
respectively and the sample sizes that the report offered was 926 in 1998, 986 in 2003 and 
1093 in 2006. 
The sample of Quarterly Female Employment Report contains information on a wide 
range of workplace characteristics. This means that controlling for organization size, 
industry and other characteristics can be introduced to assess whether having particular 
work-life balance polices is associated with turnover intention of women employees. 
  6This study focus upon the effect of some work-life balance policies in Japanese 
organizations. Table 1 shows the major work-life balance practices included in the 2000, 
2005 and 2008 editions of Quarterly Female Employment Report in Japan.   
In 2000 edition, the specific practices were: maternity leave system within the statutory 
period (6 weeks before childbirth and 8 weeks after childbirth), the full amount of 
maternity pay, child-care leave system within the statutory period (children under the age 
of 1), child-care leave benefit, family-care leave system (a total of 93 days), family-care 
leave benefit and flextime system. The survey in 2005 and 2008 editions just listed 
work-life balance practices including maternity leave system within the statutory period, 
the full amount of maternity pay, child-care leave system within the statutory period. 
Table 1 also shows the percentage of work-life balance policies have been adopted in 
Japanese organizations. Because maternity leave system and child-care leave system are 
compulsory in the Labor Standards Law, we can see that these systems had been adopted 
in most organizations. Although a part of maternity benefits are required during the 
maternity leave period in the Health Insurance Law, the adoption of the full amount of 
maternity pay was very low in these three years. 
Similarly, we can see that the adoption of child-care leave benefit, family-care leave 
benefit and flextime system were also very low in 2000. Particularly less than 5 percent of 
organizations offered child-care leave benefit. In the other item, only 30 percent of 
  7organizations adopted flextime system. Therefore, giving an analysis of the effect of these 
work-life balance policies is highly significant. 
In order to discuss the specific initiatives of work-life balance policies in our study, we 
use the variables of maternity pay, child-care leave benefit, family-care leave system, 
family-care leave benefit and flextime system as work-life balance indexes in 2000 edition. 




Dependent variables   
In order to analyze the effect of work-life balance policies, we use three measures of 
dependent variables: the job tenure of women employees, turnover rate of women 
employees and retention rate of new women graduates who had stayed in their first 
company for 3 years.
3. 
Independent variables 
The Quarterly Female Employment Report in Japan provides information on the types 
of work-life balances policies available within a company. However, it is not apparent 
whether all employees are able to take up the policies on offer. Despite the lack of detailed 
information on the use of work-life balance practices, it seems reasonable to assume that 
                                                 
3 The variables turnover rate and retention rate are replaced by a log odds ratio (logit). y=ln(p/(1-p)) 
  8firms with WLB policies are likely to balance employees’ work and family lives than 
those without work-life practices. 
As noted earlier, the adoption of some work-life balance policies are still very low in 
most organizations in our sample. Therefore, giving an analysis of the effect of these 
work-life balance policies is significant. In this paper, we use work-life balance policies 
such as maternity pay, child-care leave benefit, family-care leave system, family-care 
leave benefit and flextime system in 2000 edition as independent variables
4. And we use 
only maternity pay as an independent variable in 2005 and 2008 editions. 
Control variables 
Organization size and industry category are controlled in our analysis. Organization size 
is measured by the logarithm of the number of full-time workers. In addition, we create 
dummy variables for industry and we choose manufacturing to be the base group, that is, 
the group against which comparisons are made.   
Moreover, many factors affect the turnover intention of women employees in a 
company and it is necessary to control for these influences in order to observe the 
relationship between work-life balance policies and job tenure or turnover rate of women 
employees. It might be expected that higher women married rate and higher women age 
would increase job tenure of women employees. Therefore, the variables women married 
                                                 
4 We create dummy variables for all work-life balance policies by defining firm with a specific work-life balance policy to be one and 
zero otherwise. 
  9rate and average women age in a company are used as controls in our study. 
 
Estimation methods 
First, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) method in cross sectional data of 2000, 2005 
and 2008 editions respectively to test our hypothesis. And then we use four methods: 
pooled OLS, first differencing, random effects and fixed effects
5 to test our hypothesis. 
(1)    it it it X y ε α β + + ′ =
where i refers to the firm, and t is time.   is a dependent variable about job tenure , 
turnover rate and retention rate of women employees. 
it y
α  is a scalar,  β  is K x 1 and 
it X  is the itth observation on K independent variables. An OLS provides consistent and 
efficient estimates for  α and β   if the assumption of  α   is a correct specification. 
 
(2)    it i it it X y ε α β + + ′ =
where  i α  is the unobserved heterogeneity term, assumed to be firm-specific and 
time-invariant. Since we have panel data of firms, we are able to control for time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity which may bias the results from cross sectional studies if these 
unobserved factors correlate with independent variables. Thus, we can difference the data 
across two years
6 and then we also present random and fixed effects models in data of 
                                                 
5 In the first differencing and random effects methods, we can include industry dummy variables, but these drop out of the fixed effects 
analysis.  
6 We just have the data of turnover rate and retention rate of women employees in 2005 and 2008 editions. We first use a pooled cross 
section and then we difference all variables. 
  10three years
7. The random effects estimator is only valid if  i α  is uncorrelated with the 





The means and standard deviations for the variables used in the analysis are presented 
in Table 2. Our analysis focuses on three different types of variables. The first set of 
variables represents  firm characteristics. The next set of variables represents various 
work-life balance policies. The final set of variables represents turnover intention of 
women employees such as job tenure, turnover rate and retention rate. 
We report only the variables turnover intention here. In Table 2, we can see that there is 
a decreasing trend in tenure gap between men and women. In addition, there is a 
decreasing trend in turnover rate of women employees and an increasing trend in turnover 
rate of men employees, although the change between 2005 and 2008 is few. With regard to 




                                                 
7 Because we have the data of job tenure of women employees in 2000, 2005 and 2008 editions , we can use panel data methods. 
  11(I) Cross sectional analysis 
Findings for predicting the effect of work-life balance policies on job tenure, turnover 
rate and retention rate of women employees are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. 
To consider our hypothesis, we first report the effect of work-life balance policies on 
the job tenure of women employees and then we report the effect of work-life balance 
policies on the turnover rate of women employees and retention rate of new women 
graduates. 
First, hypothesis predicted that firms with work-life balance policies would have longer 
job tenure of women employees. We display only the result of OLS regression on 2000 
edition
8. In Table 3, the coefficient on child-care leave benefit and family-care leave 
benefit are insignificant in model 2 and model 4 respectively. Contrary to expectations, 
child-care leave benefit and family-care leave benefit policies do not have an impact on 
the job tenure of women employees. However, the variables maternity pay and family-care 
leave system are very statistically significant at 1% level in model 1 and model 3 
respectively. It means that adoption of maternity pay and family-care leave system is 
predictive of higher women tenure. For our sample, flextime system is also an important 
component of work-life balance policies. As expected, flextime system is associated with 
higher job tenure of women employees. The coefficient on flextime system is statistically 
                                                 
8 Actually, we have run the cross section analysis on 2000, 2005 and 2008 editions respectively. We only report the result of OLS on 
2000 edition here. 
  12significant at 1% level in model 5. It appears that adopting of flextime system increase the 
job tenure of women employees.   
We included all independent variables together in model 6 simultaneously. In all 
work-life balance indexes, only the coefficients on maternity pay and flextime system are 
significant in model 6. It means that only maternity pay and flextime system policies are 
associated with higher women tenure if we adopt all work-life balance policies at the same 
time. 
We also find that almost every control variables: women married rate, average women 
age and men tenure are positively related to the job tenure of women employees and the 
coefficients are all significant at 1% level in all models (model 1-model 6).   
To explore our issue further, we reestimated the equations using tenure gap between 
men and women rather than women tenure. In Table 3, we can see that although most 
coefficients on control variables are significant in model 7, with regard to WLB variables, 
only the coefficient on flextime system is statistically significant in all work-life balance 
indexes. It appears that adopting of flextime system decreases the tenure gap between men 
and women. 
Second, hypothesis also predicted that firms with work-life balance policies would have 
lower turnover rate of women employees and higher retention rate of new women 
graduates. 
  13In our analysis in 2005 edition, we just use maternity pay as a work-life balance index. 
And because we have the data of turnover rate of women employees and retention rate of 
new women graduates in 2008 edition
9, we use independent variable maternity pay in 
2005 edition and dependent variable turnover rate and retention rate in 2008 edition to 
undertake our analysis
10. 
The result of OLS regression on 2005 edition is in Table 4. The coefficient on maternity 
pay is statistically significant in women tenure models (model 1 and model 2). This result 
is the same with the result of OLS regression on 2000 edition. 
In Table 4, the difference between model 3 and model 4 is that we added the men 
turnover rate in model 4. Because we consider that firms with higher men turnover rate are 
associated with an increased probability of women turnover rate. 
With regard to the turnover rate of women employees, organizations with smaller size 
are more likely to report higher women turnover rate. And organizations with lower 
women married rate and average women age are also associated with higher women 
turnover rate. We further find that turnover rate of men employees are positively related to 
the turnover rate of women employees, as predicted. 
However, we can see that the coefficient on maternity pay is insignificant in model 3 
and model 4. Contrary to expectation, maternity pay has no impact on turnover rate of 
                                                 
9 More precisely, the survey of 2008 edition was conducted in 2006 but the data of turnover rate was in 2005. 
10 Therefore, it becomes a single cross sectional data. Instead of running the cross section analysis on 2005 and 2008 editions 
respectively, this data set solves the problem of causal relationship. 
  14women employees.   
Meanwhile, hypothesis also predicted that firms with work-life balance policies would 
have higher retention rate of new women graduates. 
The difference between model 5 and model 6 in Table 4 is that we added the men 
retention rate in model 6. Because we consider that firm with higher men retention rate is 
associated with an increased probability of women retention rate. 
Compare the result to model 3 and model 4, we find that less than half coefficients of 
control variables are significant in model 5and model 6. Although organizations with 
larger size are more likely to report higher retention rate of new women graduates, women 
married rate and average women age are almost have no effect on retention rate of new 
women graduates. 
However, we can see that the coefficient on the maternity pay is significant at 5% level 
both in model 5 and model 6. The result is different from the model 3 and model 4. With 
regard to retention rate of new women graduates, adopting of maternity pay policy tend to 
increase the retention rate of new women graduates. Thus we can say that hypothesis 
receive partial support in our study. 
 
 
(II) Panel data analysis 
  15Because we have the data of turnover rate of women employees and retention rate of 
new women graduates only in 2005 and 2008 editions, we first use pooled OLS on the two 
years and then difference the data across the two years. Besides, we have the data of job 
tenure of women employees in 2000, 2005 and 2008 editions, so we first use pooled OLS 
on the three years and then we use random effects and fixed effects methods. 
(i) Pooled OLS 
The result of pooled OLS on 2005 and 2008 editions is in Table 5. In pooled cross 
section, we added the year dummy variable in all models (the base year is 2005) and 
added the variables overtime and women on the main career track rate
11 in model 2, model 
4 and model 6. We expect that overtime is negatively related to the job tenure of women 
employees and women on the main career track rate is positively related to the job tenure 
of women employees   
The coefficient on year dummy variable is statistically significant at 1% level only in 
women turnover rate models (model 3 and model 4) and the sign of coefficient is minus. It 
means that other factors fixed, the turnover rate of women employees in 2008 is lower 
than that in 2005.   
The coefficient on overtime is statistically significant at 1% level only in model 2. It 
means that firms with longer overtime on average are associated with lower job tenure of 
                                                 
11 Different from women on the minor career track who work typically as support staff members handling miscellaneous tasks, women 
on the major career track have the similar career track with general men employees. 
  16women employees. However, we can’t find a significant relationship between overtime 
and turnover rate or retention rate of women employees. In addition, the coefficient on the 
main career track rate of women employees is statistically significant at 5% level in model 
2 and is statistically significant at 10% level in model 4. It appears that firms with higher 
women on the main career track rate are associated with longer job tenure of women 
employees and lower turnover rate of women employees.   
In our analysis of pooled OLS on 2005 and 2008 editions, we used just maternity pay as 
a work-life balance index. We first report the effect of maternity pay on job tenure of 
women employees and then on turnover rate of women employees and retention rate of 
new women graduates. 
In Table 5, the coefficient on maternity pay is statistically significant at 1% level in 
women tenure models (model 1 and model 2). It means that adopting the maternity pay 
policy increase the job tenure of women employees. However, the coefficient on maternity 
pay is not statistically significant in women turnover models and new women graduates 
retention rate models (model 3 - model 6). Therefore, adopting work-life balance policies 
is not associated with turnover rate or retention rate of women employees in pooled OLS 
models. 
 
(ii) First differencing   
  17An analysis using a single cross section or just a pooling of the cross sections will 
produce biased and inconsistent estimators. To remove unobserved firm effect, we 
difference all variables. Therefore, we regress the change in dependent variables on the 
change in all independent variables. 
Table 6 shows the result of using OLS after first differencing. We just focus on the 
coefficient on maternity pay change
12. The coefficient on maternity pay change is 
statistically significant at 1% level only in model 5
13. It means that firms with maternity 
pay system in 2005 and without that system in 2008 decrease the retention rate of new 
women graduates.   
  (iii) Pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects 
We use also three methods: pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects to test our 
hypothesis in the data of 2000, 2005 and 2008 editions. The estimation results are in Table 
7. We can see that the coefficient on the maternity pay is significant at 1% level both in 
the pooled OLS and random effects models
14. And for almost all variables, the estimators 
have the same sign between pooled OLS and random effects models. When we eliminate 
the unobserved effect entirely by using fixed effects, the maternity pay premium falls 
notably and the coefficient on the maternity pay is not significant in fixed effects model. 
                                                 
12 We create new dummy variables with regard to maternity pay change in first differenced equation. Four groups are allowed: ① firms 
without maternity pay system in 2005 and 2008 ② firms without maternity pay system in 2005 and with that system in 2008 ③firms 
with maternity pay system in 2005 and without that system in 2008 ④ firms without maternity pay system in 2005 and  2008. We 
choose ① to be a base group. 
13 It is in the case of firm with maternity pay system in 2005 and without maternity pay system in 2008.   
14 The random effects estimator is preferred when we use Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test (LM test). 
  18The Hausman test tends to receive the fixed effects estimators and if random effects model 
is used, then the estimators are generally inconsistent. Therefore, in the fixed effects 




In this paper, we have examined whether various work-life policies influence women 
employees' intention to stay or quit the company. If organizational practices can help 
employees integrate work and life demands and in turn lower their voluntary turnover 
rates, then employer’s investment in work-life balance practices is more cost- justified. 
Several findings are noteworthy. First, in the cross sectional estimate, flextime system is 
a stronger predictor of women tenure and the strongest predictor of tenure gap between 
men and women. Organization size, a part of industry dummies, average women age, 
women married rate and men tenure are also associated with significantly higher women 
tenure and lower tenure gap between men and women. 
    Moreover, we find that full amount of maternity pay and family-care leave system also 
tend to increase the job tenure of women employees although the predictors of these 
coefficient are not significant in tenure gap model (see Table 3). 
  Secondly, because we just can discuss the effect of the full amount of maternity pay 
  19system that is limited by sampling design in 2005 and 2008 editions of Quarterly Female 
Employment Report in Japan, we find that the coefficient on maternity pay is also 
significant in women tenure models and has no impact on tenure gap between men and 
women (Table 4). With regard to turnover rate of women employees, maternity pay has no 
impact on women turnover rate, whether we add the variable of men turnover rate or not. 
On the other hand, the maternity pay has an effect on retention rate of new women 
graduates by comparing the different result with turnover rate of women employees. One 
interpretation is possible: for new women graduates, full amount of maternity pay is an 
attractive policy to enable them to stay with the same company if they plan to have 
childbirth. But our study can’t sort out this interpretation. 
Thirdly, we find that in using first differencing, maternity pay change has an effect on 
retention rate of new women graduates. Firms that adopting the maternity pay system in 
2005 but withdrawing that system in 2008 decreases the retention rate of new women 
graduates. It probably implies that the behavior of adopting the maternity pay system at 
first but withdrawing that system later will affect the new women employees’ decision of 
staying in the same company. 
Finally, the maternity pay system has no effect on job tenure of women employees in 
the fixed effects model although it actually has effect in all cross sectional and pooled 
OLS models. It is considered that the cross sectional analysis could lead to bias. 
  20Because we used just a specific policy to predict job tenure of women employees by 
using fixed effects model, it probably means that only maternity pay can’t explain the job 
tenure of women employees and perhaps it is necessary to add other work-life balance 
policies to examine outcomes. For example, even if maternity pay can be required during 
the maternity leave period for women employees, if other work-life conflicts happen after 
their childbirth and firms don’t adopt appropriate work-life balance policies to solve 
work-life conflicts, women employees would quit the company.     
 
Future Research 
Based on our analysis, it is believed that this article contributes to the work-life balance 
literature in several ways. First, we have provided empirical support for the idea that full 
amount of maternity pay system has an effect on higher retention rate of new women 
graduates even though it is in the case of the cross sectional analysis. Different from the 
prior studies, work-life balance policies explains retention rate of new women graduates 
rather than turnover rate of women employees in our study
15.  
Secondly, using panel data allows us to control for firm specific effects. Although we 
find the maternity pay system has no effect on job tenure of women employees in the 
fixed effects model, we are able to control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                 
15 In our study, the definition of retention rate of women employees is that new women graduates stay in the same company 3 years 
after their first work or not. 
  21which may bias the results from cross sectional studies if these unobserved factors 
correlate with work-life balance policies. 
Thirdly, rather than focusing on a limited set of formal or informal work-life policies 
alone, we have examined the effect of various work-life policies on the job tenure of 
women employees. In sum, our findings are suggestive of a future research agenda.   
A limitation to this study is the use of detailed information about each organization. As 
noted earlier, Quarterly Female Employment Report in Japan provides information on the 
types of work-life balances policies available within a company. However, it is not 
apparent whether employees are able to use the policies on offer. Future research needs to 
evaluate the effect of different types of work-life balance policies on employees. For 
example, what kind of work-life balance policies bring about a reduction in work-life 
conflict, an increase in employee loyalty or a reduction in turnover, eventually an increase 
in financial performance. 
The formation of appropriate work-life balance policies will be integral to the creation 
of flexible workplaces conducive to the attraction, motivation and retention of 
highly-valued employees. We suggest that the adoption of a wide range of work-life 
balance policies, to deal with a variety of employee needs and demands, will have the 
potential to produce positive outcomes for the organization. 
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Table 1.    Organizations with work-life balance policies adopted 
 
2000 2005 2008
Work-life balance policies yes（％） yes（％） yes（％）
maternity leave system 99.89 99.39 99.82
full amount of maternity pay 27.77 19.92 22.85
child-care leave system 99.46 98.42 97.96
child-care leave benefit 4.91
family-care leave system 50.81
family-care leave benefit 10.37










Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
organization size
log(all employees) 921 7.616 1.019 935 7.304 1.016 987 7.163 0.985
log(men) 921 7.334 1.064 935 7.027 1.078 987 6.893 1.049
log(women) 921 5.966 1.074 935 5.597 1.120 987 5.444 1.061
Industry
media 926 0.049 0.215 986 0.054 0.226 1093 0.054 0.226
consulting 926 0.013 0.113 986 0.016 0.126 1093 0.012 0.108
telecommunications 926 0.043 0.203 986 0.104 0.306 1093 0.105 0.307
trading 926 0.092 0.289 986 0.079 0.270 1093 0.076 0.265
finance 926 0.135 0.342 986 0.094 0.292 1093 0.101 0.301
energy 926 0.018 0.134 986 0.015 0.122 1093 0.013 0.113
services 926 0.189 0.392 986 0.248 0.432 1093 0.234 0.424
other characteristics
women married rate 639 21.891 13.983 657 25.878 15.108 699 27.533 16.362
men age 910 38.671 3.630 897 38.043 4.222 919 38.826 4.027
women age 910 30.592 3.731 897 31.730 3.894 919 32.800 4.042
WLB policies
maternity leave 925 0.999 0.033 976 0.994 0.078 1085 0.998 0.043
maternity pay 922 0.278 0.448 969 0.199 0.400 1068 0.228 0.420
child-care leave 922 0.995 0.073 885 0.984 0.125 1078 0.980 0.141
child-care benefit 916 0.049 0.216
family-care leave 864 0.508 0.500
family-care benefit 588 0.104 0.305
flextime 924 0.298 0.457
turnover intention
men job tenure 895 15.209 4.548 863 13.838 5.335 872 14.430 5.094
women job tenure 895 8.610 3.449 863 9.026 4.193 872 10.018 4.557
tenure gap 895 6.599 3.718 863 4.812 3.335 872 4.412 3.362
men turnover rate 410 3.945 3.735 578 4.239 4.228
women turnover rate 426 9.260 5.672 580 8.826 6.202
men retention rate 517 84.525 14.833 692 85.489 14.439


















  27Table 3.    WLB policies and job tenure of women employees (2000 survey only)-OLS 
 
 
Depentent variable 1.women tenure 2.tenure gap
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Control variables
organization size 0.323 0.323 0.27 0.295 0.251 0.208 0.456
(0.087)*** (0.089)*** (0.092)*** (0.112)*** (0.087)*** (0.108)* (0.192)**
industry
(base:manufacturing )
    media 0.617 0.795 0.707 1.114 0.979 1.056 -2.133
(-0.741) (0.743) (0.785) (0.579)* (0.722) (0.578)* (0.869)**
    consulting -0.42 -0.197 -0.37 -0.455 -0.183 -0.739 -4.421
(0.320) (0.323) (0.368) (0.401) (0.289) (0.347)** (0.914)***
    telecommunications -0.067 0.001 0.064 -0.349 0.069 -0.367 -4.215
(0.210) (0.206) (0.230) (0.288) (0.221) (0.343) (0.790)***
    trading 0.171 0.236 0.261 0.082 0.36 0.259 -1.098
(0.179) (0.187) (0.207) (0.302) (0.193)* (0.308) (0.638)*
    finance 0.096 0.308 0.324 0.354 0.556 0.344 -1.488
(0.181) (0.166)* (0.182)* (0.224) (0.187)*** (0.282) (0.638)**
    energy 0.872 0.962 0.722 0.747 0.889 0.67 -0.914
(0.359)** (0.379)** (0.378)* (0.376)** (0.362)** (0.308)** (1.135)
    services 0.253 0.263 0.208 0.406 0.398 0.485 -2.405
(0.197) (0.200) (0.206) (0.276) (0.199)** (0.265)* (0.497)***
women married rate 0.595 0.597 0.552 0.593 0.573 0.579 -0.586
(0.105)*** (0.106)*** (0.108)*** (0.139)*** (0.100)*** (0.130)*** (0.166)***
women age 0.513 0.516 0.523 0.581 0.507 0.571 -0.352
(0.044)*** (0.045)*** (0.046)*** (0.055)*** (0.044)*** (0.053)*** (0.053)***
men tenure 0.236 0.243 0.234 0.238 0.247 0.241
(0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.026)*** (0.019)*** (0.024)***
WLB variables
maternity pay 0.399 0.538 0.434
(0.150)*** (0.203)*** (0.410)
child-care benefit -0.199 -0.094 0.65
(0.339) (0.491) (0.984)
family-care leave 0.407 0.19 0.496
(0.148)*** (0.196) (0.430)
family-care benefit 0.055 -0.184 0.374
(0.344) (0.246) (0.645)
flextime 0.603 0.611 -0.838
(0.162)*** (0.196)*** (0.378)**
Constant -12.574 -12.689 -12.609 -14.296 -12.251 -13.944 14.084
(1.513)*** (1.531)*** (1.577)*** (1.893)*** (1.499)*** (1.815)*** (2.403)***
Observations 619 615 575 374 617 366 366
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.27
***indicates significance at 1% level; **indicates significance at 5% level; *indicates significance at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.













  28Table 4.    The effect of WLB policies (2005 survey only) - OLS 
 
 
Depentent variable 1.women tenure 2. women turnover rate 3. new women graduates retention rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Control variables
organization size 0.682 0.331 -0.122 -0.027 0.322 0.267
(0.155)*** (0.132)** (0.048)** (0.041) (0.071)*** (0.074)***
industry
(base:manufacturing )
    media -0.635 -0.328 -0.41 -0.457 0.091 0.172
(0.686) (0.630) (0.211)* (0.128)*** (0.358) (0.494)
    consulting -2.17 -0.509 -0.037 -0.071 0.047 -0.357
(0.645)*** (0.602) (0.272) (0.258) (0.373) (0.248)
    telecommunications -0.861 0.356 -0.073 -0.29 -0.02 -0.069
(0.294)*** (0.261) (0.104) (0.094)*** (0.160) (0.163)
    trading 0.796 0.62 -0.184 -0.201 0.161 -0.002
(0.387)** (0.354)* (0.117) (0.093)** (0.225) (0.223)
    finance -0.198 -0.148 0.214 0.308 -0.176 -0.167
(0.405) (0.374) (0.157) (0.137)** (0.220) (0.232)
    energy 2.388 1.282 -0.74 -0.095 -0.731 -0.817
(0.965)** (0.839) (0.247)*** (0.121) (0.195)*** (0.224)***
    services -0.968 0.06 0.079 -0.071 -0.46 -0.321
(0.468)** (0.356) (0.126) (0.103) (0.162)*** (0.178)*
women married rate 1.124 0.82 -0.268 -0.204 0.097 0.118
(0.192)*** (0.172)*** (0.057)*** (0.049)*** (0.090) (0.090)
women age 0.641 0.501 -0.06 -0.054 -0.023 -0.056








maternity pay 1.08 0.626 -0.165 -0.119 0.329 0.411
(0.331)*** (0.301)** (0.107) (0.098) (0.167)** (0.166)**
Constant -13.962 -12.428 0.038 0.617 -0.407 0.533
(2.121)*** (1.925)*** (0.596) (0.503) (0.959) (1.006)
Observations 447 440 288 283 229 198
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.77 0.37 0.53 0.14 0.23
***indicates significance at 1% level; **indicates significance at 5% level; *indicates significance at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
All independent variables in 2005 edition were conducted in 2003 and the dependent variables were conducted in 2005.














  29Table 5.    The effect of WLB policies (2005 and 2008) - Pooled OLS 
 
 
Depentent variable 1.women tenure 2.women turnover rate 3.new women graduates retention rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Control variables
year 0.097 0.167 -0.244 -0.299 0.042 -0.004
(0.102) (0.128) (0.049)*** (0.059)*** (0.081) (0.103)
organization size
    log(women) -0.147 -0.208 -0.085 -0.085 0.208 0.138
(0.069)** (0.091)** (0.034)** (0.043)** (0.058)*** (0.075)*
    log(men) 0.487 0.656 -0.027 0.038 -0.107 -0.076
(0.075)*** (0.101)*** (0.036) (0.047) (0.062)* (0.081)
industry
(base:manufacturing )
    media -0.21 -0.475 -0.273 -0.075 0.744 0.756
(0.269) (0.402) (0.149)* (0.209) (0.263)*** (0.370)**
    consulting -1.312 -1.342 -0.291 -0.126 0.186 -0.201
(0.444)*** (0.595)** (0.215) (0.266) (0.330) (0.436)
    telecommunications -0.538 -0.561 -0.132 -0.093 0.195 0.305
(0.178)*** (0.225)** (0.080)* (0.099) (0.135) (0.177)*
    trading 0.154 0.343 0.054 0.173 0.207 0.326
(0.183) (0.230) (0.082) (0.100)* (0.135) (0.175)*
    finance 0.065 0.493 0.38 0.279 0.071 0.392
(0.217) (0.304) (0.110)*** (0.138)** (0.179) (0.237)*
    energy 0.86 0.531 0.134 0.185 0.583 0.445
(0.524) (0.670) (0.299) (0.291) (0.386) (0.436)
    services -0.255 -0.652 0.23 0.305 -0.212 -0.085
(0.146)* (0.180)*** (0.072)*** (0.086)*** (0.116)* (0.144)
women married rate 0.423 0.433 -0.051 -0.06 0.109 0.137
(0.068)*** (0.089)*** (0.035) (0.041) (0.052)** (0.073)*
women age 0.665 0.649 -0.025 -0.01 -0.014 0.001
(0.018)*** (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
men tenure 0.206 0.16
(0.011)*** (0.013)***
men turnover 0.411 0.419
(0.031)*** (0.035)***
men retention 0.405 0.354
(0.043)*** (0.056)***
overtime -0.027 0.004 0
(0.007)*** (0.003) (0.005)
women on main carrer 0.488 -0.173 -0.185
track rate (0.195)** (0.091)* (0.157)
WLB variable
maternity pay 0.663 0.81 0.065 0.074 0.034 0.13
(0.145)*** (0.183)*** (0.071) (0.083) (0.118) (0.146)
Constant -17.122 -16.671 0.344 -0.493 0.398 0.338
(0.688)*** (0.904)*** (0.355) (0.428) (0.526) (0.712)
Observations 1242 770 607 403 477 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.43 0.44 0.27 0.24
***indicates significance at 1% level; **indicates significance at 5% level; *indicates significance at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.











  30Table 6.    The effect of WLB policies (2005 and 2008) - First Differencing 
 
 
Depentent variable 1.women tenure 2.women turnover rate 3.new women graduates retention rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Control variables
organization size
    log(women) -0.977 -2.653 1.277 0.491 0.247 0.63
(0.186)*** (0.475)*** (0.537)** (0.711) (0.956) (1.226)
    log(men) 0.392 1.989 -0.584 0.19 0.462 1.383
(0.262) (0.455)*** (0.572) (0.867) (1.088) (1.405)
women married rate -0.084 0.191 0.019 0.124 0.097 0.154
(0.103) (0.153) (0.189) (0.215) (0.336) (0.369)
women age 0.46 0.5 0.026 0.102 0.202 0.232
(0.032)*** (0.045)*** (0.066) (0.072) (0.113)* (0.158)
men tenure 0.193 0.164
(0.039)*** (0.053)***
men turnover 0.325 0.427
(0.086)*** (0.087)***
men retention 0.688 0.484
(0.153)*** (0.200)**
overtime 0.002 -0.015 0.042
(0.013) (0.017) (0.032)
women on main carrer -0.374 0.085 -1.31
track rate (0.322) (0.496) (1.214)
materity pay change 
(base: 05 no,08 no)
05 no, 08 yes 0.21 -0.227 0.133 -0.561 -0.517 0.419
(0.304) (0.445) (0.527) (0.606) (0.847) (0.992)
05 yes, 08 no 0.254 0.666 0.308 0 -3.005 0
(0.487) (1.018) (0.678) 0 (1.573)* 0
05 yes, 08 yes -0.082 -0.039 0.315 0.363 0.334 -0.098
(0.137) (0.204) (0.225) (0.296) (0.404) (0.542)
Constant 0.27 0.175 -0.43 -0.674 -0.3 -0.34
(0.074)*** (0.101)* (0.130)*** (0.151)*** (0.235) (0.297)
Observations 393 196 114 68 62 32
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.52 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.36
***indicates significance at 1% level; **indicates significance at 5% level; *indicates significance at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.


















  31Table 7.    The effect of WLB policies (2000, 2005 and 2008)   
- Pooled OLS, Random effects and Fixed effects 
 
 





    log(women) -0.109 -0.232 -1.393
(0.056)* (0.066)*** (0.172)***




   media 0.011 -0.107
(0.229) (0.284)
   consulting -1.013 -1.434
(0.357)*** (0.470)***
   telecommunications -0.42 -0.677
(0.153)*** (0.193)***
   trading 0.189 0.11
(0.142) (0.180)
   finance 0.164 0.369
(0.167) (0.206)*
   energy 0.809 0.942
(0.383)** (0.451)**
   services -0.091 -0.266
(0.113) (0.138)*
women married rate 0.473 0.361 0.018
(0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.079)
women age 0.624 0.652 0.657
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.021)***
men tenure 0.214 0.155 0.016
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)
WLB variable
maternity pay 0.588 0.573 0.115
(0.110)*** (0.126)*** (0.250)
Constant -15.938 -16.272 -8.675
(0.555)*** (0.597)*** (1.415)***
Diagnostic Test
Number of obersation 1861 1861 1861
Number of groups 1195 1195 1195




F test that all u_i=0 F(1194, 660) =4.29  Prob > F = 0.0000
Breusch and Pagan Chi2(1)=179.94
Lagrangian multiplier test  Prob > Chi2= 0.0000
Hausman specification test Chi2(6)=324.54
Prob > Chi2= 0.0000
***indicates  significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters.  
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